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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES*
BY MARJORIE JEAN BONNEYt
III
RECENT PHASES OF THE RAILROAD STRIKE PROBLEM

T

problem of the railroad labor dispute assumed new proportions in 1916 when the four brotherhoods" united for
the first time in a demand for higher wages and shorter hours.
The revolution in congressional attitude which followed this
demonstration of strength by the brotherhoods, and the resulting
trend toward the adoption of drastic measures call for separate
treatment in this final chapter.
Congress in 1913 had reached the peak of its policy favoring
voluntary arbitration. As long as capital had stubbornly refused
to arbitrate Congress had felt the need of exerting compulsion
upon the railroad companies but even in the acts of 1888 and
1898 had adhered in the main to the policy of voluntary arbitration. But when in 1913 capital by its friendly attitude toward
arbitration showed that compulsion was unnecessary, Congress
passed the Newlands Act providing for arbitration which is entirely voluntary.97 Congress had not conceived of the possibility
that labor might repudiate arbitration.98 When in 1916 this occurred,99 and Congress was forced, by the fear of a nation-wide
strike, to grant labor's demands by legislation, the legislative atHE

*Continued from 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 467.
tSpecial Agent of the Federal Children's Bureau.
96
The Brotherhoods of Locomotive Engineers, Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen, and Railroad Trainmen, and the Order of Railroad Conductors.
97The clauses of the Erdman Act forbidding and declaring unlawful
strikes and discharges pending arbitration and for three months afterwards were omitted in the Newlands Act. These clauses had been dead
letters
in the Erdman Act.
98
Labor, at the time the Newlands Act was passed, had never endangered industrial peace by refusing to submit its differences to arbitration. In the crisis which gave rise to the Newlands Act the employees
were willing to arbitrate under the Erdman Act as it stood, but the
carriers
refused. See supra, chapter I, pages 467-78.
99
The brotherhoods in this year "dissatisfied with the personnel and
decisions of recent arbitration boards, insisted upon their demands being
granted and voted to strike." The roads were willing in 1916 to arbitrate.
(Bing, War-time Strikes and Their Adjustment 83.)
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titude changed. Congress, which in previous years had argued
heatedly in favor of voluntary arbitration, 100 in 1920 argued
with equal fervor for anti-strike legislation.' 0' It passed finally
a measure'1 2 which, as interpreted, compels submission to arbitration, and which by reason of the attitude of the Department of
Justice, may, in many cases, compel submission to the award. 0 3
The remainder of this article, apart from a brief discussion of
the Adamson Act, will deal with the Transportation Act of 1920.
The Adamson Act 0 4 was passed by Congress to avert the rail
strike of 1916 after both mediation and presidential intervention
had failed. It did not provide for arbitration. It was in itself
an act of intervention. Ostensibly it gave labor an eight-hour
day. Actually it granted a compulsory wage increase operative
for a limited period, 05 not because investigations had proved it
desirable, for no investigations had been made, but because labor
demanded it as an alternative to a strike.10 Nor did the act provide for permanent machinery for dealing with labor disputes.
President Wilson, in his request for the bill, had recommended

that compulsory investigation be provided,' 07 and Senator Under10ONote what Representative Clayton had to say on compulsory arbitration in the debate over the Newlands Act: "God forbid . . . that Congress should ever enact compulsory arbitration laws. It would be in the
teeth of the constitution; it would be in the teeth of the inherited rights
of every free American to have any sort of law whereby any man could
be compelled to render labor against the sovereign will which he carries
under0 his own hat." (Cong. Rec., 63rd Congress, first session, p. 2434.)
2oSenator Cummins: "Even if I were to grant that the individual
right to cease employment is perfect and complete I could not grant that
the right to enter into a combination or conspiracy to accomplish a purpose
inimical to the welfare of society is a natural or constitutional right." Senate debate on Esch-Cummins bill Cong. Rec., Dec. 4, 1919, p. 146.
10241
03

Stat. at L. 456-499.

1 See infra, p. 556.
10439 Stat. at L. 721.
' 0 7The president's Eight Hour commission, in making its report, as
provided for in the act, said, "It is well to emphasize the fact that while
the law requires eight hours to be the measure or standard of a day's
work for the purpose of reckoning the compensation for train service
employees, it does not limit the actual working time to eight hours." The
congressmen themselves knew the bill to be a wage-fixing bill. Said Senator
It is
Sherman, "In essential analysis this is not an 8-hour day law ...
a question of the increase of wages by paying ten-hour wage for eight
hour service." Cong. Rec., 64th Congress, p. 13616. The law did, in actual
operation, cause an eight-hour day to be instituted in the yard service, and
the time of some of the train crews was shortened- but it was primarily a
wages0 law. Eight-Hour Commission report.
1' Note attitud Senator Underwood took toward the bill; he said:
"For one I am willing to surrender my individual judgment, admit that
I am legislating without knowledge, to bring peace . . . to the home of
of the nation. (Cong. Rec., 64th Cong., first session, p. 13556.)
the people
10 7For the six requests made by President Wilson in submitting his
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wood, during the course of the debate, proposed giving to the
Interstate Commerce Commission wage-fixing powers.108 Neither
provision was included in the act, however. The result therefore, was an act which did nothing more than settle an existing
dispute.
The problem left unsolved by the Adamson Act was solved
for a period of over two years by federal control of the railroads," 9 under which all disputes were settled by bi-partisan
wage-adjustment boards. With the return of the railroads to
private control the old problem reared its head and Congress bent
its energies toward including in the act returning the railroads
an effective section which would minimize the strike danger.
It has been noted that Congress was by this time vigorously
discussing anti-strike measures. The courage openly to advocate
such measures was probably gained from the judicial support
given the Adamson Act in the case of Wilson v. New,"' It was
here held that a general railroad strike constituted such an obstruction to interstate commerce as to bring the whole subject
within congressional control. The case, moreover, strongly suggested in dicta that it was within the power of Congress to pass
a compulsory arbitration law,"' and hinted that the right of railroad employees to strike could be limited. Said Chief Justice
White:
"Whatever would be the right of an employee in a private
business to demand such wages as he desires, to leave the employment if he does not get them, and by concert of action to
agree with others to leave upon the same conditions, such rights
are necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business charged with a public interest."
The Senate, using much the same line of argument, 112 passed
a bill which made a conspiracy to strike punishable by a maxiplea for the Adamson Act to Congress, see the Congressional record, 64th
Congress,
first session. p. 13361 (message to joint session).
108 For Underwood's proposals, see ibid, p. 13611 (was amendment).
09
1 Lack of space makes it impossible to discuss the relationship of the
government to the labor strike problem during the war period. For a
full discussion of this phase of federal intervention in labor disputes see
Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time and After, and Bing,
War-Time Strikes and Their Adjustment.
110(1916) 243 U.S. 332, 61 L.Ed. 755, 37 S.C.R. 298.
"'Said the court, "Congress had the right to adopt the act in question,
(the Adamson Act) whether it be viewed as a direct fixing of wages to
meet the absence of a standard on that subject . . . or as an exertion by

Congress of the power which it undoubtedly possessed to provide by appropriate 2 legislation for compulsory arbitration."
" Note statement by Cummins, supra p. 551 footnote 101.

FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES

553

mum fine of $500. A committee of wages and working conditions and three regional boards were created as "substitutes for
the strike."'1 3 The House, however, objected to the anti-strike
clause, and in conference it was stricken out. We are now ready
to turn to a discussion of the labor section of the Transportation
Act as it was finally passed." 4
It is fundamental to note at the outset that this section is not
operating as it was intended to operate. It seems designed primarily to stimulate conciliation and to afford machinery for voluntary arbitration only in case that fails. In practise it has
stifled conciliation and elevated arbitration to a position of first
importance. 115 In short, in its operation it runs counter to the
lessons experience with labor disputes has taught, and has failed
to render the useful service of which it is capable. Before reviewing the transformation of the act from a measure providing
for conciliation as the chief functioning agent and arbitration
simply as a last resort, to one nullifying conciliation and utilizing
arbitration as the sole remedy, we must review briefly its main
provisions.
The act provides first, that when disputes likely to interrupt
commerce arise between carriers and their employees, "such disputes shall be considered and if possible decided in conference
between the parties concerned." 16 It next provides that when
the carriers and their employees desire, adjustment boards, authorized to settle disputes arising out of grievances, rules and
working conditions may be established." 17 Clearly conciliation
was here in mind. The act then provides for a Railroad Labor
Board of nine, composed of three representatives of labor, three
of capital and three of the public, which is charged to hear and
decide wage disputes not settled in conferences, and all disputes
over grievances, rules and working conditions not settled by ad-

"13For the debate on the original Esch-Cummins bill providing for the
anti-strike clause, see Cong. Rec. 6th Congress, first session, Dec. 4, 1919.
"4Sections 300 to 315 of the Transportation Act, (41 Stat. at L. 456,
469-473, 66th Cong. 2nd session Chapt. 91). The act is very broad in its
scope applying to "all carriers, their officers, employees and agents." (Sec.
301) 5 In its breadth of scope the act is comparable to the act of 1888.
"1 Note statement made by Representative Esch in reporting the bill
from the conference: "There is no compulsion in the bill. The only thing
that can be done by the Railroad Labor Board is to subpoena witnesses
... in order that a full, complete and thorough investigation can be
made ....
There is nothing in this bill regarding compulsory putting
into effect the award of this railroad board." (Cong. Rec., Vol. 59, p. 3270.)
'11641 Stat. at L. 456, 469 sec. 301.
11741 Stat. at L. 456, 469, see. 302.,
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justment boards. 118 The awards of the Labor Board are to be
published. 119 No other provision is made for their enforcement.
The Labor Board is, however, given the authority to make investigations when it believes one of its awards has been violated,
but it can then do no more than "make public its decisions in such
120
manner as it may determine."
Conciliation is being stifled and arbitration encouraged chiefly
because the act, unlike previous arbitration acts, permits either
side to inaugurate arbitration proceedings.1 2' The result is that
the conferences provided for by the act have become futile; for
the weaker side to a dispute, fearing the results of collective bargaining, is almost always eager to rush through the conferences
and push the matter to the Labor Board where it feels it may
secure more satisfactory terms.' 22- The first moves to correct this
evil have come from the employees. Members of the craft federation, dissatisfied with the summary manner in which the railroad executives discuss disputes, have asked that the Labor Board
remand to local conferences disputes which have not been fully
discussed. 123 As long as either side feels that it has more to gain
from the Labor Board than from the collective bargain, and can,
by refusing to agree in conference, get its case to the board, conciliation under the act will continue to be ineffective and arbitration the most common means of settling disputes.
Nor are the adjustment boards provided for by the act fostering conciliation to any great extent. The transportation brother118 The Labor board is established by sec. 304 of the Transportation
Act. 41 Stat. at L. 456, 470. This section provides that the representatives
of the labor and management groups be appointed by the president from
six nominees each named by the respective groups and that the president
appoint directly the three representatives of the public group. In case
either side fails to nominate the president is authorized by sec. 305 to
appoint directly the representatives for that side. Sec. 307 (c) provides
that decisions by this board shall require the concurrence of at
least 5 of the 9 members, and that in the case of wage disputes, at least
one member of the public group must concur in the decision.
141 Stat. at L. 456, 470 sec. 307.
12041

Stat. at L. 456, 473 sec. 313.

' 21 Permission is not definitely given. The fact that the failure of
conferences carries cases to the board operates to give this general effect,
however.
2
1 2A general chairman of one of the craft organizations has assured
the writer that the act does actually function in this manner. Recently the
shop crafts, he stated, conferred with the executives over new rules. Out
of these conferences only thirty-eight rules were jointly agreed to; the
matter was then removed to the Labor Board where 186 rules were
laid 22
down.
' Statement by a general chairman of the Brotherhood of Railway
Carmen of America.
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hoods are the only organizations which have cooperated with the
railroads in the formation of adjustment boards. These brotherhoods, in conjunction with fifty railroads have established a bipartisan board in each of the three regional districts. These
boards, however, have a very limited jurisdiction. They are deprived by the act itself of jurisdiction over wage disputes, and
they are further deprived by the agreements under which they
are established, of the jurisdiction which the act aimed to give
them over disputes concerning changes in rules and working
conditions. 24 Conciliation is therefore functioning in the very
limited field of personal grievances, and disputes arising out of
the construction of rules and schedules established by the Labor
Board.
While practise is thus encouraging arbitration official interpretation of the act is making that arbitration compulsory in the first
instance by establishing the power of the Labor Board to compel
submission of disputes for consideration. This power is based
on interpretation of sections 301 and 307. The former states
that all disputes not decided in conference shall be referred by
the parties to the board authorized to hear and decide such disputes, and the latter states that the Labor Board shall hear and
decide all disputes not settled by adjustment boards and shall receive for hearing and decide all disputes with respect to wages
when such disputes are likely substantially to interrupt commerce.
When in 1921 the railroad employees were threatening to
strike against the wage reduction recently recommended by the
Labor Board, that body, asserting that the threatened strike was
one liable to interrupt commerce, announced on October 22125
224In a general letter to "All general chairmen, local divisions and
lodge members employed in the United States on railroads members of
regional boards," instructions were sent out by the presidents of the four
brotherhoods that "only disputes growing out of personal grievances or
out of the interpretation, or application of the schedules agreements or
practises now or hereafter established . . . shall be submitted to the board,
(regional)," and it was specifically stated in large type that "All disputes
arising out of proposed changes in rules, working conditions or rates of
pay are specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the board and under
no circumstances should you attempt to submit them." General letter dated
Cleveland, 0., Nov. 1, 1921, and signed by W. S. Carter of the Firemen,
W. S. Stone of the Engineers, L. E. Sheppard of the Conductors and
W. G.25Lee of the Trainmen.
1 The public group of the board had earlier submitted a proposal
for the settlement which had been rejected. The board itself had attempted
mediation which had also failed. When this latter method failed it was
generally thought that the Labor Board had exhausted its powers. Its
action on Oct. 22 was heralded by the New York Times as a "sensational
development" which "left interested leaders too astounded to comment."
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that it assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, and summoned both
sides to a conference which was convened October 26. It also
commanded the unions to maintain the status quo pending a hearing and a decision, an order that was "tantamount to a demand
that the strike order for October 30 be rescinded."' 2 6 The act
does not specifically forbid a strike pending investigation as does
the Canadian Industrial Disputes Act, but sections 301 and 307
give practically the same effect as a specific prohibition. As noted
above they command the parties to submit the dispute to the
proper board for hearing and decision. The logical deduction,
therefore, is that since the dispute is submitted for decision it is
intended that no cessation of work occur prior to such decision.
The question whether or not the board possessed the actual
power to prevent a change in the status quo pending investigation
was not answered in 1921, since the strike vote was recalled prior
to October 30. The board, nevertheless claimed this power as
well as the power to compel the parties to a dispute to appear
before it and present their case. After the crisis was past it laid
down the general rule that:
"When any change of wages, contracts or rules previously in
effect is contemplated or proposed by either party conferences
must be had as directed by the Transportation Act . . . and
when agreements have not been made the dispute must be brought
before the board and no 27action taken or change made until
authorized by the board.'
The board itself claimed no power to enforce its awards. It
merely provided in a second general rule that whenever a strike
should occur contrary to an award that:
"The organization so acting has forfeited its rights, and the
rights of its members in and to the provisions and benefits of all
contracts heretofore existing, and the employees so striking have
voluntarily removed themselves from the classes entitled to appeal
to this board for relief and protection.' 28
The Department of Justice, however, claims that it is within
the power of the government to stop by injunction strikes on
Even Senator Cummins had not believed that the Labor Board could take
such steps as it took on Oct. 22, for a few days earlier he had said: "Of
course if both sides are not willing to permit arbitration by the Railroad
Board of their differences, then the railroad act becomes entirely ineffective."
' 26 New York Times, Oct. 22.
' 2T New York Times, Oct. 30. (Published by R. M. Barton, chairman of the board.)
12BIbid.
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interstate railroads.129 If this assertion can be substantiated the
result will be that the award of the Labor Board, although unenforceable under the act will, in many cases, become in actual
practice, compulsory upon the parties. Particularly will this be
so in the case of awards granting wage reductions. In such cases
the employees will find themselves obliged to accept the reduction authorized by the board, or, unless they can come to a separate agreement with the carriers face the injunction. The railroads, on the other hand, it should be noted, would have the alternative of retaining the status quo in case a wage increase was
recommended by the board. 30 Let us examine this claim of the
Department of Justice, made first in 1921 and later repeated
indirectly in connection with the railroad shopmen's strike.
It had been hinted in the newspapers early in the history of
the 1921 controversy, that a legal method of enforcing the awards
of the Labor Board had been found. It was suggested that the
rail strike was an "overt act" which could be enjoined on the
ground that the unions were violating an order of a branch of
the government.' 3' When, however, on October 27 AttorneyGeneral Daugherty announced the action the government would
take if a strike occurred the Transportation Act was not mentioned. He based the right of the government to halt the strike
by injunction wholly upon federal conspiracy statutes'3 2 and upon
the case of In re Debs. It is difficult to see how the claim of the
government that a railroad strike constituted a conspiracy against
the government could have been upheld. In In re Debs and
Wilson v. New, 3 3 however can be found seemingly clear author120A statement of the measures which the government would take
if a strike were called on October 30 was issued by Attorney-General

Daugherty on October 27. (Published in the New York Times of that
date.)
130If the Department of Justice should look beyond the actual physical
obstruction to the cause of such obstruction it is possible that in a case
where a strike resulted because of a refusal of the roads to put in effect
a wage increase recommended by the board, the roads might be enjoined
from disregarding the award of the Labor Board on the ground that by so
acting3 they were directly responsible for the strike.
' 'New York Times article, Oct. 22. (The strike was officially called
in protest
to the wage reduction of 1920 authorized by the board.)
132The chief reliance was placed on sec. 5440 of the criminal code,
which makes an overt act in connection with a conspiracy against the
United States punishable by a fine not to exceed $10,000, two years' imprisonment, or both. Two other sections of the federal penal code providing fines for conspiracies to deprive citizens of any constitutional rights or
privileges were also mentioned.
'33(1916) 243 U.S. 332, 61 L.Ed. 755, 37 S.C.R. 298. (See supra,
Chapt. II, p. 482 footnote 74 also supra, this chapter, p. 552.)
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ization for governmental intervention in railroad disputes. The
former sustains the right of Congress to remove any obstruction
of interstate commerce; the latter holds that a strike on interstate
roads constitutes such an obstruction to commerce. The only
constitutional question remaining is, can this governmental intervention take the form of compulsion of personal service? The
existing court decisions suggest a negative answer to this question;"34 but with the Daugherty injunction case pending in the
courts of the United States, it is not revolutionary to prophesy
that the Supreme Court may sooner or later squarely decide what
Wilson v. New hinted in dicta, namely that the rights of railroad
employees to quit work, in view of the public nature of the employment, can be limited.
The Daugherty injunction in enjoining acts which indisputably would be legal in private controversies 13 5 has definitely
assumed, apparently, that the government possesses the right to
place limitations on the freedom of action of those persons engaged in the movement of interstate commerce which it never,
constitutionally, could place on other private individuals. If the
courts of the United States uphold this injunction without modification, it seems reasonably clear that they will be obliged to base
their decision on a declaration of the power of the government.
under the commerce clause, to limit the freedom of action of
interstate railroad employees. While such a decision might avoid
a direct assertion of the power of the federal courts to compel
personal service, per se, the effect would be materially the same.
On the day when a decision is handed down by the courts, either
directly asserting the constitutional right of the government to
compel personal service, or upholding its power to so limit personal freedom that the compulsion of service is the practical result,
arbitration, for the employees at least, will be, in effect at least,
compulsory in every aspect.
It is interesting to note at this point that all doubt concerning
the ability of the Railroad Labor Board to enforce its awards,
has been dispelled by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 86 This decision, which recognized the power of
the Labor Board to undertake to enforce through publication, the
134 Supra, Chapt. II.
135 See page 479 supra, footnote 65.
"38 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States R. Labor Bd., (1923) 43
S.C.R. 278. For decisions in lower courts see (1922) 282 Fed. 693; (1922)
282 Fed. 701.

FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES

559

holding of a new election by employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad, held that the Railroad Labor Board had no power to enforce
awards which, after publication, had been disregarded. The district court, which denied the jurisdiction of the Labor Board,
sustained the constitutionality of the Transportation Act itself.
It is evident, therefore, that practise and official interpretation
are fast transforming the Transportation Act of 1920 into a compulsory arbitration act. The carriers and their employees no
longer make honest attempts to settle their disputes themselves
before carrying them up to a government agency. In previous
years, under the Erdman and Newlands acts the two sides were
accustomed to spend months in attempts to come to an agreement
between themselves; then perhaps they would request mediation,
or mediation would be proffered, and more time would be spent
in endeavoring to reach a settlement. In the majority of cases
disputes were settled by mediation, but in any event arbitration
was not sought until all efforts to reach a settlement by the collective bargain had been exhausted. But at the beginning of the
rail dispute of October 1921, when representatives of the men
met committees of railroad executives in the eastern, southeastern and western districts the railroads briefly "declined to make
any concession or offer any solution providing for a settlement."13 7 And when later executives of the labor organizations
met with a committee of railroad executives, a two-hour conference, "distinctly lacking in conciliatory spirit," was sufficient
to demonstrate that no agreement could be reached.""8 Therefore,
after conferences lasting hours instead of weeks and months, in
which no conciliatory spirit was shown, the case went to the
Labor Board for decision. Likewise the railroad shopmen, who
went out on strike last July and the executives of the roads
scorned the conference tables. Direct action, in this instance,
was substituted for arbitration.
The result, therefore, is that the disputes which were formerly
settled in most cases by the parties involved are today being
13YStatement by Warren S. Stone, president of the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers in New York Times, Oct. 18. The railroad employees met with eastern executives Aug. 3 with southeastern executives
Aug. 16 and with western executives Aug. 17. Executives of southwestern
roads did not meet with the men. At these meetings the employees
asked what steps the roads planned to take on the wage situation, and the
answer was in every case that the roads planned to proceed with the wage
reduction. (Based on New York Times accounts.)
138This conference was held Oct. 14 in Chicago. (New York Times,
Oct. 15.)
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settled by a government board before which the parties meet
"not as parties to a conference but as parties to a suit at court."'13
The settlement is being made, moreover, not by the management
group and not by the men, but by the public group whose understanding of the situation is based on such summary investigations
as can be made by a board which in 1921 had 1,300 cases pending. 4 0 And the award, if it becomes enforceable, will be enforced by a branch of the government which does not consider
the merits of the case.'

41

The ineffectiveness of the Railroad Labor Board as a strikeaverting body, which was partially revealed by its near-failure
in the rail crisis of 1921 was emphasized by its inability to prevent or to settle the shopmen's strike last summer. The shopmen,
in defiance of an award of the board authorizing the railroads
to reduce the wage-rate went on strike in July and remained out
until the middle of September despite all efforts of the board to
effect a settlement of the dispute between them and their roads.
The first action of the Labor Board when the strike was put
into effect, was to pass an "outlaw" resolution which precipitated
the entire seniority dispute. Obtaining no results from this resolution, the board proposed a peace conference. The roads, however, refused to participate in this conference unless the employees recalled the strike vote. This the employees refused to dQ,
and the proposal came to nothing. Chairman Hooper of the
board then held informal conferences and a basis of negotiation
which included the return of the workers with full seniority
rights, was reached. The roads flatly refused to consider the
restoration of seniority rights, however, and the deadlock remained unbroken. President Harding then intervened with his
peace proposals which likewise proposed to protect the seniority
rights of the striking shopmen, and hence were futile. Conferences between the Interstate Commerce Commission' and the
railway executives, and between Secretary of Labor Davis and
' 3 9Samuel Gompers in an article condemning the Railroad Labor
Board. (New York Times.)
14OIbid.
141Said Attorney General Daugherty, commenting on the conference
of state attorneys-general which was held to discuss the action the government could take in case of a rail strike, 'We did not discuss the merits
or the matters in dispute . . . with the merits of the controversy the Department of Justice takes the position that it has nothing to do and the
merits will probably not be entered into at any time

. . .

many more

Americans are interested in [the railroads], in seeing that they serve the
public than in this controversy regardless of who is right or who is
wrong." (New York Times, Oct. 25.)

FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES

561

the strikers, were likewise unavailing and the president's compromise which provided that the seniority issue go to the Labor
Board for decision was refused by the roads. The transportation brotherhoods then intervened, but their arbitration failed
likewise, the seniority issue once more blocking success. Then
came the Wilkerson restraining order September 1, which was
followed shortly by a partial settlement under the Baltimore
agreement. Under this settlement arrangement was made for
the adjustment of the seniority issues by a committee of six
representatives of the railroad organizations and six representatives of the employees.
The futility of the efforts of the Railroad Labor Board to
settle this strike has aroused active dissatisfaction with the
Transportation Act in official as well as in unofficial circles, and
the likelihood is that the coming year will see important changes
in railroad labor legislation. President Harding, referring to the
Transportation Act in his message to Congress last December,
stated that "it is now impossible to safeguard public interest because the decrees of the board are unenforceable against either
employer or employee," and declared that "public interest demands that ample power shall be conferred upon the labor
tribunal . . . to require its rulings to be accepted by both parties
to a disputed question." While he recognized the right to cease
labor, he limited the recognition by observing that "since the
government assumes to safeguard his interests, (those of the
laborer) while employed in an essential public service, the security of society itself demands his retirement from service shall
not be so timed and related as to effect the destruction of that
service." He referred to the partisan nature of the board as one
of its chief weaknesses, and proposed as a substitute a nonpartisan labor division in the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Secretary of Labor Davis has openly advocated the abolition
of the Railroad Labor Board, and many of the labor organizations, equally disgusted with the board, have announced their intention of returning to direct dealings and have indicated that
they would welcome the restoration of the Newlands Act.
The ineffectiveness of the Labor Board in averting strikes
does lie as President Harding pointed out, in its inability to enforce its own awards. Until, however, the conciliation features
of the Transportation Act are fundamentally strengthened and
arbitration looked upon, not as the initial remedy but as the last
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resort in the settlement of strikes, will it be in accord with justice
to give to the Labor Board the power to enforce its decisions.
In moving toward a system of compulsory arbitration which
offers the two sides to the dispute no adequate opportunity to
come to a settlement between themselves, the government is disregarding all of the lessons its own experience has taught. 42
The Transportation Act as passed aimed primarily at conciliation and only secondarily at arbitration. Is it not possible, therefore, in the light of past experience, so to amend the act that it
will achieve the results at which it aimed and which experience
justifies?
Experience has taught three major lessons. It has taught,
first, that the parties directly involved in a dispute are, in the
majority of cases, capable of settling their own disputes through
the collective bargain without recourse to arbitration, and that
settlements reached in this manner are more satisfactory than
settlements reached through awards of arbitration boards. It
has taught, secondly, that conciliation, from the point of view of
the public, functions with complete success only when it is accompanied by investigation and publicity. 4 3 And it has taught
finally that no machinery for the settlement of labor disputes is
complete which does not afford the public an opportunity to safeguard its interests. Experience, therefore recommends an act in
which conciliation is the functioning agent; in which compulsory
investigation is an indispensable factor, and in which the public
is adequately protected from the strike which may result in spite
of the opportunities afforded for a fair and just settlement of
labor disputes by conciliation and compulsory investigation.
The Transportation Act already provides the machinery for
the type of act which experience recommends. The entire trouble
142 Experience in Australia seems likewise to justify conciliation rather
than compulsory arbitration. Since 1910 when the Commonwealth arbitration act was amended to give the president of the labor court power to

compel conferences, increasing stress has been placed on conciliation. (See
1918 report of the National Industrial Conference board.) And in 1920
an "Industrial Peace" Act was passed which "may be regarded as a sincere attempt to improve the machinery of industrial conciliation." (Unsigned article on Australia in the March, 1921, number of the Round

Table.)

This act makes provision for a Commonwealth council on which

are six representatives elected by the employers, six elected by the workers
and a chairman appointed by the Governor-General. It provides also that
a district council of a similar nature may be named. Three excellent articles
on the Australian court: A New Province for Law and Order. by Henry
Bournes Higgins, in 29 Harv. L.R. 13, 32 Harv. L.R. 189, 34 Harv. L.R.
105, 4.ive
clear acc,,nts nf the ;unctionincr of the Australia law.
' 3 See supra, Chapt. I, p. 478. footnote 59.
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lies in the fact that the machinery is not functioning properly.
The machinery for conciliation is found in the conferences provided for in section 301 and in the adjustment boards provided
for in section 307.144 But we saw that neither conferences nor
boards are actually encouraging conciliation. Compulsory investigation is also provided for by the act which in sections 308
and 310 endows the board with complete inquisitorial powers.
But compulsory investigation becomes a farce in the face of a
docket of 1,300 cases. And, finally, in the labor board itself is
found the machinery for the protection of the public interest.
The board, however, instead of functioning as a court of last
resort, is overburdened with the work of a court of first instance.
The question now is, how can this available machinery be remodeled and strengthened in order that the act may achieve the
results at which experience aims ?145
Conciliation can be vitalized by compelling the formation of
bi-partisan regional adjustment boards. It is suggested that three
adjustment boards, corresponding to adjustment boards, 1, 2 and
3 formed during the war, 4 ' be established in each of the three
regional districts, and that these boards be charged with the duty
of hearing all wage disputes as well as all disputes, arising out
of the establishment of rules and working conditions. Conciliation can be further vitalized, and the public interest safe-guarded
at the same time, by withdrawing from the disputants the privilege of appealing to the Labor Board and placing this privilege in
the hands of two representatives of the public, who it is recom47
mended, should attend all sessions of the adjustment boards.
The adjustment boards should be charged with the final determination of disputes over rules and working conditions, and only
wage cases should be appealable to the Labor Board. For the
problem of rules and working conditions, is, because of its extreme technicality, one that the carriers and their employees are
144
See supra, p. 553.
' 45 It will be impossible, because of the limits of space, to give any
more than the bare outlines of the sort of act which the writer believes
will function best in handling labor disputes.
'46Board of Adjustment Number 1 had jurisdiction over men connected with the movement of trains. Board Number 2 dealt with railway
shopmen and Board Number 3 was charged with the adjustments concerning switchmen, telegraphers and clerks. Bing, War-Time Strikes and
Their4 7Adjustment.
' 1t is added as a qualifying suggestion that these public representatives attend, only those hearings which involve wage disputes. It is possible
that there might be a public interest involved in a change of rules, however, and in such cases the public men should attend.
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best qualified to settle; and if, moreover, the Labor Board is to
function successfully in wage disputes, it should not have its
calendar glutted with hundreds of technical cases. Finally, the
act should specifically forbid strikes or lockouts pending the hearings before the regional boards, and should command, also, that
in cases where settlements are not reached by the regional boards,
the status quo be maintained pending a further hearing by the
Labor Board, and a decision.
In order that investigations may be complete and thoroughgoing it is recommended that a federal officer, endowed with the
power to subpoena witnesses and demand the production of books
and papers, be appointed by the president for each regional district. It is further recommended that this official have the assistance of a committee on which is represented the carriers, the
employees and the public.1 4 This official, in the case of wage
disputes, should investigate the financial condition of the railroads, the cost of living in the district, rates of pay in other industries and the special hazards, skill or training involved in
railroad labor which warrant a variation from the standard
rate. 149 In the case of disputes over rules and working conditions
he should make a study of the technicalities giving rise to the
need for new rules or working conditions. The results of these
investigations should then be submitted to the regional boards,
and should form the basis of a settlement. 50
Compulsory investigation, accompanied by publicity will enable public opinion to exert a powerful force in favor of a fair
settlement. In order, however, that public opinion may be even
more carefully directed, it is suggested as noted above that two
representatives of the public, preferably appointed by the president,151 sit regularly on the adjustment boards. These public
representatives should have no vote. Their function should be,
first, to question freely in order to bring out all facts and secondly
to appeal wage cases to the Labor Board, first, when deadlocks
' 48The public representatives on these investigating committees, would
in all probability be appointed by the two public representatives on the
regional
boards.
149The Railroad Labor Board in the present act is charged to take
into account these factors, 41 Stat. at L. 456, 470 see. 307.
15OThe federal investigator might also be charged with the duty of
investigating charges made by either side that the other side was not abiding
by the settlements of the board.
15'Men who are strongly allied in sympathy with either side should
never be appointed to the positions of public representatives or regional
boards. The public representatives, in order to best serve the public, should
be unbiased and unprejudiced in their judgments.
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occur, and secondly, when the settlement involves a compromise
which places an unwarrantable burden on the public.1 52 Appeals
should be accompanied by the recommendations of the public
group, based on the findings of the investigating committee and
on the facts brought out at the conferences.
The Railroad Labor Board, under this plan of reorganization,
would function as a supreme court of review in wage dispute
cases. Instead of itself instituting investigations as it does today,
it would accept the "records" of the "lower court," and base its
decisions primarily on these records, inaugurating only such additional investigations as it deemed necessary to formulate a just
award.
It is suggested that this supreme wage court be constituted
of nine non-partisan men thoroughly familiar with the economics
involved in the establishment of wage rates. Such a court would
be distinctly superior to the present labor board on which we
noted practically all decisions are made in the last analysis by the
three public men who have no intimate knowledge of the technicalities involved. Labor, which opposed a non-partisan court of
"public" men on the ground that in such a tribunal political considerations outweigh justice, could not raise the same objection
to a non-partisan court of eminent economists drawn from professional fields. For a court of men of this calibre would be
primarily interested in handing down a decision in accord with
the economics of the case. It is further suggested that these
technical men be appointed by the president on the advice of
prominent educators of the country. This would further remove
them from political influence.
It is advocated, finally, that this supreme tribunal be endowed
with the power to enforce its awards. Strong as is the force of
public opinion, which is the only enforcing agent in the EschCummins bill, it is not sufficiently strong, experience has demonstrated, effectively to protect the public against the strike danger.
Provision must be made for some more potent force which can
say to the railroads, "you must accept this award," and to the
railroad employees, "you must not strike," before the public can
be adequately insured against transportation tieups. The writer
1 52

1n order to avoid deadlocks between two representatives which
would prevent appeals, the act should provide that either representative
could appeal a case to the Labor Board. The dissenting representative
should, however, be permitted to file a "dissenting opinion" with the Labor
Board in support of the decision of the regional board. The problem of
the deadlock would arise of course, only in cases where a decision of a
regional board was thought to be contrary to the interests of the public.
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would not advocate endowing the Esch-Cummins Labor Board
with the power to enforce its decisions. For labor would be
justified in opposing compulsory arbitration that is not preceded
by bi-partisan conferences which offer both parties adequate and
well-protected opportunities to present their cases in detail and
to reach a settlement between themselves. Neither labor nor
capital, however, could protest on the grounds of justice compulsory arbitration which functions only after both sides to a
dispute, assisted by compulsory investigation, have exhausted
every effort to themselves settle their differences. If labor and
capital cannot come to terms in such conferences as the writer
has advocated, the public is entirely justified in demanding that
the awards of the supreme court empowered to review wage disputes be enforceable in law.
Amended on the lines suggested above, the Transportation
Act would be purged of its objectionable features and would be
greatly strengthened as a strike-averting body. Compulsory investigation and bi-partisan conferences would become the functioning agents in the settlement of labor disputes instead of arbitration, which would be held in reserve until labor and capital
had clearly demonstrated their inability to come to terms. Arbitration, when resorted to, however, would be far more effective,
since in the amended act the arbitration awards would be enforceable in law. No protection now afforded to the public by
the Transportation Act would be destroyed by its amendment
along the lines suggested. Instead the public, enlightened by
compulsory investigation and fortified by representation in the
original conferences would find in its own increased strength
additional assurance against strikes; and should even the increased strength of public opinion be found incapable of averting
industrial disturbances, the public would find that it was fully
protected in a supreme wage tribunal which was authorized to
enforce its awards.
No discussion of federal intervention in labor disputes is complete which does not include a reference to the vital need for effective federal intervention in the coal mine dispute. The coal
strike of 1919 closed schools, hospitals and factories; it handicapped train service and caused suffering in hundreds of homes.
The mine strike inaugurated in April, 1922, which remained unsettled until September, undoubtedly would have reproduced the
suffering of 1919 had it continued many more months. As it is
coal prices soared to such a height, as a result of the curtailed
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supply, that many families suffered from insufficient fuel in their
homes last winter.
Despite the fact, however, that the entire American public
has a distinct interest in the continuous production of coal, the
federal government has not yet established a right to intervene
in mine disputes as it has intervened in railroad disputes. Congressional agitation for the establishment of a federal coal tribunal corresponding to the Railroad Labor Board and endowed
with similar powers has become increasingly persistent however,
following the recent serious mine strikes.1 53 The position of the
congressmen who are urging a federal coal tribunal, is strengthened by a suggestion made by Attorney-General Daugherty that
since fuel is indispensable to transportation, the government has
the same authority to prevent interference with the production
of coal as it has to prevent interference with transportation itself.'" It is certainly possible that the commerce clause will be
interpreted, before long, to sanction congressional regulation of
coal mine disputes. Since the majority of serious disputes in the
mine fields center about opposition to unionism and unwillingness
of the operators to bargain collectively with the miners, compulsory conferences which would force the operators to recognize
the union and the collective bargain should be the first aim of a
federal act regulating mine disputes. Compulsory investigation,
public representation in local councils and a federal coal tribunal
are the other features for which a mine disputes act should provide. The awards of the federal coal tribunal, like the awards
of the suggested supreme railroad wage board, should be enforceable in law.
The coal mining industry is at present under investigation by
a federal coal commission. 15 This commission, which made its
first report, (incorporating in it information relative to wage
rates, earnings, employment, costs and profits of the industry,
competition of other fuels, and coal produced by non-union
mines) last January, is "seeking to promote industrial peace by
ascertaining and publishing certain facts." It is interesting to
note that the commission in making this report, after commenting
that "the public interest in coal raises fundamental questions of
the relation of this industry to the nation and of the degree to
' 53
Note Senator Kenyon's proposal, New York Times, April 28.
' 54See statement by Daugherty, relative to April 1922 mine strike and
the government's
right to intervene. (New York Times. March 22.)
' 55This commission is composed of John Hays Hammond, Thomas
Marshall, Judge Samuel Alschuler, Clark Howell, George Otis Smith, Dr.
Edward T. Devine and Dr. Charles P. Neill.
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which private right must yield to public welfare," observes that
"it may be that both private property in an exhaustible resource
and labor in a public service industry must submit to certain
modifications of their private rights, receiving in return certain
guarantees and privileges not accorded to purely private business
or persons in private employ." A long step toward the final settlement of the mine dispute problem would be taken if congress,
acting in accord with this sentiment, would recognize mining as
a public service industry subject to regulation by the government,
and provide for the type of collective bargain and investigation
suggested above.
Summarizing the results of the foregoing investigation of the
extent to which the federal government has established its right
to interfere in labor disputes, it is evident that the government
has, by 1923, developed extensive powers of intervention. In
the Transportation Act of 1920 it has secured for itself the right
to hear and decide all disputes involving interstate railroads. It
has reached out into the field of local disputes through the conciliation division of the Department of Labor, and, with the injunction it is intervening in disputes which indirectly interfere
with interstate commerce. The present system of federal intervention, however, is weakened by two serious defects. In the
first place it is incapable of protecting the public from the mine
strike, except extra-legally. In the second place it is overlooking
the importance of mediation and conciliation, and is relying too
completely on arbitration and the injunction, both of which are
distasteful to labor. The government may correct the first defect
by assuming jurisdiction of the mine dispute under the commerce
clause of the constitution. The second defect may be remedied
by encouraging, through an amended Transportation Act, collective bargaining instead of compulsory arbitration, which as noted
above, should be retained only as a "last resort" remedy.
A system of federal intervention which extends to mine disputes as well as to railroad disputes will ensure greater industrial
peace. A system of federal intervention, for both rail and mine
disputes, which is based on the collective bargain, but which protects the public against the strike that may result from deadlocks
in the bi-partisan conferences; a system which grants to labor
and capital a full opportunity to settle their own disputes but
provides for a supreme court of review to safeguard the public
against the misuse of this opportunity-such a system will ensure an industrial peace which will be based on industrial justice,
justice to labor, to capital, and to the public.

